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Abstract
Interpersonal relations are shaped by the judgements associated with the social cate-
gories that individuals perceive in their social contacts. I develop a model of how those
judgments form based on a theory of symbolic values. The model depicts the interac-
tion between two values, one associated with an inherited ethnic trait ("nationality") and
one with an endogenous achievement trait ("income"). Individuals with lower cognitive
ability are predicted to invest more value on nationalism and to have hostile relations
with immigrants. Multiple equilibria are possible and better schooling may eliminate
equilibria with xenophobia. Econometric ndings based on data from three large surveys
corroborate the predictions derived from the theoretical model.
Keywords: nationalism, xenophobia, interpersonal relations, value systems.
JEL-Classication: Z1.
1 Introduction
Interpersonal relations have an idiosyncratic and a common component. On the one hand,
any interpersonal relation is the product of a unique history of interactions between con-
crete human beings and of their memories of that history. On the other hand, interper-
sonal relations unfold in a socially constructed mental frame: individuals encounter each
other as carriers of traits whose saliency and meaning are to a large extent socially deter-
mined. People rst meet as men and women, white and black, subordinate and boss, and
only after - if their communication deepens - as individualized persons. First encounters1
are governed by the expectations and judgements associated with the social categories
- like gender, race, and occupation - that individuals perceive in their social contacts.
Those judgements heavily a¤ect the utility derived from interpersonal relations. They
may determine whether a rst encounter begins with a smile or with raised eyebrows,
with deference or disdain, with a handshake or an erected nger. And the quality of a
rst encounter may determine whether the relation continues and on which track. Since
social judgments carry such heavy consequences, peoples search for personal contacts as
well as their e¤orts to avoid them, along with the resulting network of relations, depend
on the prevailing stereotypes associated with social categories.
This paper considers the case where peoples evaluation of social categories are a matter
of choice. Based on a theory of symbolic values proposed by Corneo and Jeanne (2009,
2010), I explore the extent to which parents interested in their childrens welfare will teach
them to believe in the superiority of their own nation and to despise immigrants. The
model o¤ers an explanation for the emergence of xenophobia without positing adverse
economic e¤ects of immigration for natives. Thus, it conforms well with recent empirical
ndings by Card et al. (2009) on the determinants of attitudes towards immigration in
Europe. They nd that "compositional amenities" - associated with the non-economic
consequences of immigration - are substantially more important in explaining attitudes
than concerns over the impacts of immigration on wages and taxes. Those amenity e¤ects
are found to be especially strong in case of less-educated natives.
The model in this paper captures the idea that parents try to transmit values that serve
best their childrens interest both in terms of their economic welfare and self-esteem. By
stressing the importance of economic success, parents make their children more willing to
exert work e¤ort and increase the probabililty that they will eventually reach a high income
1Gui (2005) introduced this terminology to describe those peculiar acts of production and consumption
that characterize interpersonal relations from an economic viewpoint.
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level. However, economic success is uncertain and stressing economic success carries the
risk of a loss of self-esteem in case of bad luck. Teaching pride in own nation is an easy way
to sustain ones self-esteem without risk. When parents choose how much value they put
on economic success and national pride, they compare the benets that those values confer
upon their children with the costs of instilling values. That trade-o¤ turns out to hinge
upon the ability of children - because higher ability increases the probability to have a
high income. The model predicts that above a certain threshold, nationalism is decreasing
with individual ability. Parents of high-ability children expect them to be successful with
high probability; for them it is optimal to strenghten the achievement orientation of their
children thereby increasing further the probability of success and at the same time raising
the probability of a high level of self-esteem. Since a heavier investment in achievement
orientation increases the marginal cost of further socializing their children, parents of
high-ability children optimally decrease their investment in national pride. Conversely,
parents of low-ability children anticipate a low probability of economic success and prefer
to instill nationalism so as to secure at least some self-esteem to their children. Analysis
of this trade-o¤ for very low levels of ability reveals that the opposite pattern - where
nationalistic attitudes are increasing with ability - can also exist. In the general case, the
relationship between nationalism and ability is therefore hump-shaped.
This paper proceeds as follows. In Sect. 2, I sketch the main ideas of the theory
of symbolic values developed by Corneo and Jeanne (2009 and 2010). Sect. 3 applies
that theory to nationalism, studies the relations between natives and immigrants, and
shows the causal e¤ect of ability on nationalism. In Sect. 4, the models prediction are
confronted with empirical evidence obtained from three large representative surveys. Sect.
5 concludes.
2 Theory of symbolic values
Some personal characteristics, like nationality and level of income, seem to be invested
with symbolic values by human beings. These values determine the esteem that individ-
uals receive from other people as well as their self-esteem. Those values are symbolic in
the sense that they are intangible: they a¤ect the well-being of individuals - so they are
values - but without a¤ecting their consumption of material goods - so they are symbolic.
A system of symbolic values is a set of judgments about salient characteristics. A theory
of symbolic values should explain the variation of those judgments across social groups
and single individuals. The theory of symbolic values developed in Corneo and Jeanne
(2009, 2010) is based on four main assumptions:
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1) Evaluative attitude. Individuals pass judgments of approval, admiration, etc.,
and their opposite upon certain traits, acts, and outcomes.
Those judgements are determined by an individuals value system, which is a way to
allocate value to bundles of judgeable characteristics. Formally, the value system of an
individual is a function that maps an exogenous set of judgeable types onto the real line.
2) Social approbativeness. Individuals desire a good opinion of oneself on the part
of other people.
The relevant human environment for approbativeness may be an individuals family,
friends, colleagues, neighbors, or society at large. The desired ways of thinking may be
in a scale that distinguishes contempt, indi¤erence, interest, approval, praise, admiration,
and veneration.
3) Self-approbativeness. Individuals have a desire for self-esteem.
The desire for a pleasing idea of oneself presupposes self-consciousness. Humans are
both actors and spectators of what they do. Since they are evaluative beings, they also
judge themselves.
4) Consistency. The standards of approbation or disapprobation which the individual
applies to himself are the same as those which he applies to other people.
This postulate corresponds to the rule of judging yourself as you would judge of others.
While psychologists have identied ways of self-deception, in the main individuals are
subject to the control by the logic of consistency. It is di¢ cult to systematically approve
in oneself acts which one condemns in others, and when one does so, his fellows are quick
to point out the inconsistency.
Value systems arise within various socialization structures. Symbolic values are trans-
mitted in a cultural process by agencies of socialization like the family, the peers, and
the media. Parents are a main agency of socialization and the models in Corneo and
Jeanne (2009, 2010) employ the theory of symbolic values to study how altruistic parents
socialize their children in various contexts that matter for economic growth and respect
for diversity.
The idea that values are not xed but purposively chosen led Akerlof (1983) to develop
models of the labor market where parents teach their children to be loyal to employers. Ak-
erlof and Kranton (2000)s economic theory of identity further generalized that approach.
Bisin and Verdier (1998, 2000) combined purposive socialization with an evolutionary ap-
proach. In their models, vertical socialization, along with random imitation, determines
the long-term distribution of cultural traits in the population. A comparison of those
approaches with the theory of symbolic values sketched above is o¤ered in Corneo and
Jeanne (2009).
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3 A model of immigrants-natives relations
Beliefs in the superiority of ones own ethnicity can have serious implications for the
relations between immigrants and natives and for a countrys economic performance. Im-
migrants constitute a sizeable share of the overall world population and often belong to
the most vulnerable strata of the population. Negative stereotypes about immigrants
reduce their chances in the labor market and their quality of everyday life, including life
at schools and in workplaces. Nativeshostility may foster negative stereotyping by im-
migrants with respect to the national majority, giving rise to a mental arm race in terms
of prejudices. That arm race can a¤ect political outcomes and even turn into episodes of
violence.2 From an economic viewpoint, chauvinistic attitudes may be a formidable ob-
stacle to the immigrantsintegration in the domestic economy and the recognition of their
talents. Nativeshostility may induce immigrants to cluster together in neighborhoods
and schools, where unfavorable peer e¤ects prevent both cognitive and noncognitive abili-
ties to develop as they could. In this fashion, xenophobia may generate a lasting negative
impact on innovation and economic growth.
In the sequel, a formal model of immigrant-natives relations is developed that allows
one to dissect the role of value formation and the interplay between symbolic values and
economic outcomes.3
3.1 Assumptions
Consider a model economy populated by a continuum of atomistic individuals i 2 [0; 1].
Individuals have a common utility function but di¤er with respect to their nationality,
ability, and family background. A fraction  of the population consists of immigrants, a
fraction 1    consists of natives; for simplicity, all immigrants are assumed to share a
common nationality. Ability refers to cognitive skills, as opposed to noncognitive skills
2In Germany, right-wing extremist parties could benet from mounting xenophobia and anti-Semitism
in some recent regional elections; as reported by Siedler (2008), between 1990 and 2005 the number of
right-wing extremists in Germany more than doubled. Anti-immigrant feeling was a key factor in the
electoral success of the National Front Party in the 2002 French election; as simulated by Roemer and Van
der Straeten (2005), xenophobia substantially reduced the redistributive content of the partieselectoral
platforms. Historically, feelings of superiority of own nation have helped to legitimize fascism, colonialism
and imperialism. In turn, fascist leaders used their rethoric to foster racial and ethnic divisions.
3Bisin et al. (2008) and Della Giusta and Hashimzade (2009) o¤er related models of cultural assimi-
lation of immigrants. The model in the current paper can also be interpreted as one of racial relations.
I do not touch on the important issue of how values a¤ect the extent of racial and ethnic discrimination
in labor markets. See on this the recent contribution by Vendrik and Schwieren (2010). Notice that
statistical discrimination seems to leave a considerable part of observed discrimination unexplained. In
controlled experiments, Fershtman and Gneezy (2001) found no evidence of statistical discrimination and
much evidence in support of mistaken ethnic stereotypes.
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that in the current model are mirrored by the endogenous values endorsed by the individ-
uals.4 Cognitive ability is summarized by the pair (; ) and family background by the
pair (; ), to be explained later. No restriction on the joint distribution of the ability and
family-background paramters in the population is imposed. All individuals consume one
homogeneous good, used as the numeraire. Each individual faces the following sequence
of events: rst, the individual exerts e¤ort in order to shape his value system; this can be
interpreted as a benevolent parent socializing her child. Second, the individual, given his
values, decides how much e¤ort to exert in order to achieve in economic terms. Third,
Nature determines the individual achievement levels; individuals consume according to
their achievements and obtain esteem and utility from interpersonal relations according
to how their characteristics are valued in society.
Material Outcomes
Achievement is dened in terms of the income level received by the individual when
adult, which can be either the high income level wH or the low income level wL. Achieving
is a random event which depends on an individuals ability and his e¤ort during adulthood.
Ability is determined by exogenous factors, like inherited family traits and the quality of
compulsory schooling received by the child. Denoting by e(i) individual is non-negative
e¤ort level, the probability to succeed is given by Prfw(i) = wHg = (i)+ (i)e(i); where
parameters  and  are both non-negative. Parameter  stands for those individual
capabilities that increase achievement independently of an individuals e¤ort;  measures
the extent to which individual achievement is responsive to individual e¤ort. E¤ort is
costly, and its cost to the individual is specialized to e(i)2=2!, where ! is a preference
parameter of the utility function.
Let  denote the fraction of achievers. Their wage wH() is assumed to satisfy w0H() 
0, while w0L()  0, with wH(1) > wL(0). The rst two inequalities can be seen as a
reduced-form model for a labor market determination of the returns to human capital.
Value systems.
Individuals have value systems dened over two attributes: nationality n 2 f0; 1g and
achievement a 2 f0; 1g. Let n = 1 denote domestic nationality and a = 1 denote high
income. The value attached to the trait combination an by individual i is measured by a
non-negative index van(i). The collection of the four van(i), one for each type, describes
the value system of individual i; it satises
4As shown by empirical research on human development, cognitive ability as measured by IQ scores
becomes stable much earlier in life than noncognitive ability. This is asociated with the slowly developing






van(i) = 1: (1)
Value systems are determined by an exogenous factor that is common to all individuals
with the same nationality (possibly the same for both nationalities) and by an endogenous
idiosyncratic factor. The common factor is the reference value system fbvang for nationals
and fevang for immigrants. The reference value system mirrors public values as put forward
by collective discourse. They are the outcome of a whole history of ideas and taken as
exogenously given. By way of an example, public values that stress the fundamentally
equal worth of all individuals, independently of their traits, may be captured by bvan = 1=4
for all a and n. Public values that stress the superiority of own country of origin may
instead give rise to bva1 > bva0 and eva0 > eva1; public values that stress the special worth of
individual accomplishments may induce bv1n > bv0n and ev1n > ev0n.
The idiosyncratic factor captures how an individual is socialized. I concentrate on
vertical socialization by benevolent parents, thus abstracting from horizontal and oblique
socialization. If parents do not exert e¤ort, individuals are assumed to endorse the refer-
ence value system of their nationality. By exerting e¤orts, parents can shift their childs
values away from the reference value system. This captures the malleability of character
during childhood and early adolescence that has been identied by research on human
development.5
Parents who invest in their childrens values may inuence the relative value that













va0(i). Parentsinuence depends on the amount of resources that they use
to socialize their children. Let ja(i)j and jn(i)j respectively denote a parents investment
in achievement orientation and in nationalism; a positive a(i) stands for putting more
emphasis on achievement orientation as compared to the reference value system; a positive
n(i) stands for increased nationalism if i is a native family and for decreased nationalism
if i is an immigrated family. The resulting value system for a native is given by:
v11(i) = maxfminfbv11 + a(i) + n(i); 1g; 0g
v01(i) = maxfminfbv01   a(i) + n(i); 1g; 0g
5See e.g. Cunha and Heckman (2009).
6
v10(i) = maxfminfbv10 + a(i)  n(i); 1g; 0g
v00(i) = maxfminfbv00   a(i)  n(i); 1g; 0g:
Analogous expressions hold for immigrants after substituting bvan with the correspondingevan. Without signicant loss of generality, I assume that parameters are such that parents
choose internal values, i.e. van(i) 2 (0; 1) for all a, n and i.
Instilling individual values is assumed to be costly for parents, e.g. because they
have to spend time teaching them or because they have to buy services from distinctive
educational institutions. Specically, there is rstly a cost caused by the overall amount
of socialization e¤ort exerted by parents, ja(i)j + jn(i)j. Secondly, parents incur a
specic cost for manipulating the value attached to each single trait, achievement and
nationality. Both costs can be thought of as depending on a parents skill in transmitting
values. Parents whose own value system attaches a large value to achievement must spend
less e¤ort in order to obtain a given increase in her childrens valuation of achievement
as compared to parents who attach little value to achievement. Similarly, nationalistic
parents have a comparative advantage in transmitting an attachment to nation. Total












Parameters  and  capture both the values of the parents and the intrinsic strength
of the national value system: the weaker parentsvaluation of a given trait and the more
convincing the reference value system of their group, the larger are the costs to inculcate
di¤erent values, and the smaller are  and .
Utility function.
Families care about consumption, self-esteem and interpersonal relations, in addition
to e¤ort costs. Their additively separable preferences are represented by the utility func-
tion

















The rst term on the r.h.s. captures the childs utility from consumption, which is given
by his wage when adult. The second one captures utility from self-esteem. An individ-
uals self-esteem is the esteem in which he holds his type: an individual i of type an has
self-esteem van(i). Self-esteem has a value per se, independently of social interactions.
The utility derived from those interactions is captured by the third term of the utility
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function. I assume that adult individuals are randomly matched into pairs. At each en-
counter they exchange courtesy or hostility according to their traits and values. Courtesy
and hostility are relational goods that are not exchanged through markets but through
social interactions. For brevity, I refer to the entire set of goods consumed within those
interpersonal relations as to the social esteem experienced by individuals. The treatment
that an individual receives from a social contact depends on the value attached by his
social contact to the individuals type. I assume that nationality is perfectly observed by
social contacts, while achievement is observed with probability 1 . The expected social
esteem received by a native with achievement level a 2 f0; 1g is therefore given by











where ba is the fraction of achievers in the native population. A symmetric denition of
socv(i) applies for migrants.6
The preference parameters  and  are strictly positive; they respectively capture the
strength of the concern for self-esteem and for the quality of interpersonal relations.
Equilibrium.
An equilibrium is a situation in which each family (i.e. parent-child couple) chooses its
e¤ort levels to shape its values and to obtain high income so as to maximize its expected
utility, taking the choices of all other families as given. To shorten the exposition, I only
consider parameter constellations that give rise to equilibria that are interior with respect
to the probability to achieve, i.e. such that  + e 2 (0; 1).
3.2 Individual optimization
At the family level, both the wage structure and the allocation of social esteem are taken
as exogenouos. A native family maximizes
(+e) [wH +  (bv11 + a + n) + socv11]+(1  e) [wL + (bv01   a + n) + socv01] C(a; n; e);
(5)
where














6This modeling of social interactions could be enriched along several dimensions. First, individuals
may be assumed to care more about the esteem received from somebody of the same nationality. Second,
individuals may be assumed to have a higher probability to meet somebody of the same nationality.
These two extensions would have similar implications. Finally, the matching rate could be endogenized,
as e.g. in Corneo (2005).
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is a shorthand for the costs incurred by the agent as a function of his three control
variables. The immigrantsdecision problem is similar and will not be explicitly presented.
As a rst step, it is instructive to discuss the determination of the childs achievement
level. When the child selects his e¤ort, his value system has already crystallized, inducing
reduced-form preferences for e¤ort summarized by the objective function




The rst-order condition for an interior maximum entails
e = ! [(wH   wL) + (v11   v01) + (socv11   socv01)] : (6)
Thus, an individuals expected achievement +e is driven by four factors: his ability, as
proxied by  and , his character, as proxied by v11  v01, pecuniary incentives, wH  wL,
and social incentives, socv11 socv01. As shown by (6), values transmitted to the individual
by society and his parents generate an incentive e¤ect: the individuals e¤ort is strictly
increasing with v11   v01 = bv11   bv01 + 2a. The intuition is simple: the larger the value
attached to achievement, the larger is the self-esteem obtained from achieving relative to
the self-esteem in case of failure, and the stronger is the incentive for the individual to
exert e¤ort.7
When parents socialize their children, they anticipate the incentive e¤ect of value
transmission. The result of their maximization exercise is described in the following8
Proposition 1 A unique optimal strategy always exists and has n > 0 in case of natives
and n < 0 in case of immigrants. Depending on parameter values, one of the following
cases occur at the optimum: 1) a < 0, e
 = 0; 2) a < 0, e
 > 0; 3) a = 0, e
 > 0; 4)
a > 0, e
 > 0.
Parents have an incentive to invest in nationalism because it has a positive inuence
on the childs self-esteem for sure and a small investment causes negligible costs. Instead,
parents do not necessarily invest in the achievement-orientation of their children. The
7This result accords well with empirical ndings from wage regressions reported by Fortin (2008).
Using US longitudinal survey data, she shows that attaching value to economic success when the individual
is in his teens signicantly raises the individuals wage when he is age 32.
8Proofs of all propositions appear in the Appendix. In order for the maximization problems to be
well-behaved, parameters must satisfy
+  +  > 422!( + );
which I assume to be the case throught the paper.
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welfare impact of investing in achievement orientation can be decomposed into a direct
and an indirect e¤ect. The direct e¤ect is the expected change in self-esteem caused by
attaching more value to achievement. Its expected return is positive if and only if the
probability for the child to be an achiever (given by +e) is larger than the probability to
be a loser (given by 1  e). The indirect e¤ect stems from the change in the marginal
return to e¤ort. Increasing the achievement-orientation of the child generates an incentive
to exert more e¤ort because the achievement orientation increases the loss of self-esteem
in case of failure. If the probability to achieve is low, the direct e¤ect dominates and the
parent decides to invest to decrease the achievement orientation of her child (a < 0). If
the probability is high, the direct and the indirect e¤ects reinforce each other and the
parent chooses to enhance the achievement orientation of her child (a > 0).
3.3 General equilibrium
At the general-equilibrium level, the income levels of achievers and losers and the social
esteem of each type are endogenous. The wage determination follows the usual logic of
scarcity: the wage di¤erential is given by
w = wH ((1  )ba+ ea)  wL((1  )ba+ ea);
which is decreasing in the fraction of achievers in the two groups, ba and ea.
The di¤erence in social esteem between achievers and losers reads
dsocv = (1  ) h(1  )(bv11   bv01 + 2ba) + (ev11   ev01 + 2ea)i
for natives and
gsocv = (1  ) h(1  )(bv10   bv00 + 2ba) + (ev10   ev00 + 2ea)i
for immigrants, where ba and ea are the average investments in achievement orientation
in the two groups. Those average investments increase the social esteem of the achievers
and decrease the social esteem of the losers, and hence raise the esteem di¤erential.
The following fact can be established:
Proposition 2 A general equilibrium always exists. Multiple equilibria are possible if
 < 1 and  is su¢ ciently large.
Multiple equilibria are generated by the externality induced by symbolic values: if
some agents start investing value on a given endogenous attribute like economic success,
the social esteem derived from having that trait increases and induces other agents to
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imitate them. More precisely, an increase of achievement orientation for some children
increases the social esteem received by achievers as compared to losers; this strengthens
the incentive for other children to exert e¤ort, hence their probability to succeed increases.
Anticipating that, their parents have an incentive to raise the achievement orientation of
their children, i.e. a bandwagon e¤ect of increasing achievement orientation sets in. In
order for this cumulative causation to occur, an increase of achievement orientation must
e¤ectively increase the esteem received by achievers relative to that received by losers,
socv1n   socv0n. This is only possible if achievement is observable ( < 1). If achieve-
ment is private information, all natives get the same social esteem, independently of their
achievement, all immigrants get the same social esteem, independently of their achieve-
ment, and social esteem has no behavioral e¤ect. In order for that cumulative causation
to generate multiple equilibria, utility must respond strongly enough to changes in social
esteem. If a low-achievement-orientation, low-e¤ort economy is a stable equilibrium, a
high-achievement-orientation, high-e¤ort economy can also be a stable equilibrium only
if the gain of social esteem of achievers in the latter case compensates in utility terms
the associated higher e¤ort cost and lower income gain. This requires  to be su¢ ciently
large.9
Multiple equilibria are interesting because they reveal the possibility of a drastic ef-
fect from improved schooling. In case of multiple stable equilibria, a low-achievement-
orientation, low-e¤ort equilibrium coexists with a high-achievement-orientation, high-
e¤ort equilibrium. Then, a small schooling reform that marginally increases childrens
abilities (; ) may eliminate a stable equilibrium with low achievement orientation, and
therefore low social esteem to achievers. Starting from such an equilibrium, the economy
will move to a high-achievement equilibrium, where achievers obtain a high level of social
esteem. In this case, output grows and the skill wage di¤erential wH   wL decreases
because of the increase in the fraction of achievers.
3.4 Predictions for nationalism
While natives and immigrants could have similar incentives to shape values about achieve-
ment, they have diametrically opposed incentives with respect to nationalism. If the two
ethnic groups are otherwise identical, two individuals that only di¤er with respect to their
nationality optimally choose opposite levels of n. Those choices determine the di¢ dence
that they experience when they interact. Investments in nationalism may thus be seen
9A similar logic explains the existence of ghetto cultures, where social esteem is obtained in some
groups not from achieving in terms of personal income but from achieving in other dimensions, e.g.
sexual prowess; see Anderson (1999).
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as proxies for interethnic conict or inversely related to the quality of social interactions
between natives and immigrants.10
In the current model, nationalism can be predicted by ability. The following result is
stated for natives and an equivalent one holds true for immigrants.
Proposition 3 Increasing  gradually moves the optimal strategy from conguration 1 to
2 to 3 to 4 as of Proposition 1. The correlation between nativesnationalism and ability is
@n
@








< 0 in conguration
4.
The comparative statics of  crucially depend on the plausible assumption incorpo-
rated in (2) that the marginal cost of instilling values increases with jaj+ jnj; that means
that putting more pressure on children to strive for economic success makes it harder to
press them also to become ardent nationalists. This e¤ect is also at work if parents want
to de-emphasize economic success, which is what happens in congurations 1 and 2. In
those congurations, the ability parameter  is very low and parents invest to decrease the
value attached to achievement (a < 0) in order to raise their childs future self-esteem.
In that range of abilities, when  grows, parents become less certain that their child will
be a loser. Then, an increase of  leads them to make a less negative, i.e. they come
closer to their groups reference values: parentssocialization e¤ort as expressed by jaj
decreases. As a consequence, the marginal cost of investing in nationalism becomes lower.
This leads parents to increase n.
A further increase of  moves the optimal strategy into conguration 3. This region
is characterized by a corner solution with respect to achievement orientation, i.e. a = 0:
the agent endorses the valuation of achievement given by the reference value system of his
nationality. This is the parameter region where nationalism reaches its peak since parents
can devote their entire socialization e¤orts to it: no e¤ort is devoted to a¤ect the achieve-
ment orientation of children. This occurs because the parent is very uncertain about the
future economic status of her child. Economic uncertainty therefore fuels nationalism.11
If  crosses some threshold, parents invest in achievement values (a > 0) and con-
guration 4 occurs. In this region, the complementarity between socialization and childs
e¤ort sets in. An increase in  leads parents to invest more value in achievement, which
increases e¤ort, which increases the probability to succeed, which makes investing in
10This is consistent with a line of thougth that goes back to Voltaire and the Frankfurt sociological
school and that purports that national pride implies ethnic prejudice. For a recent, more nuanced,
assessment, see de Figueiredo and Elkins (2003).
11This result corresponds to a common nding in social psychology, see e.g. Mullin and Hogg (1998).
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achievement even more appealing. The ensuing increase in the marginal cost of social-
ization leads parents to decrease their investment in nationalism. An increase in childs
ability makes therefore parents substitute nationalism with achievement orientation.
The comparative statics of  can be explained along similar lines. In conguration
1, e = 0 so that  does not matter. In congurations 2, 3 and 4 the e¤ect from  is
qualitatively identical to the one from .
In the most general case, ability entertains a hump-shaped relationship with national-
istic attitudes. At very low levels of ability - such that e = 0 and/or a < 0 - nationalism
is increasing with ability. At intermediate levels - where individualsuncertainty about
future economic perspectives is largest - nationalism peaks and small changes in ability
have no e¤ect on it. At higher levels of ability, nationalism continuously declines with
ability.
To the extent that  and  do not only mirror genetic traits but also capture the ex-
ogenous quality of schooling received by children, Proposition 3 generates a novel insight
into education policy. Suppose that all families nd themselves in the realistic case of
conguration 4. Then, more e¢ cient schooling indirectly increases the labor productiv-
ity of the next generation because it strengthens the incentive for parents to tilt their
childrens character away from ethnic complacency and towards conscientiousness and
perseverance. As a consequence, the interpersonal relations between migrants and na-
tives improve. Through the incentives it generates with respect to socialization within
families, better schooling not only promotes growth but also reduces xenophobia.
4 Corroborating evidence
The theoretical model suggests that ability is an explanatory factor of nationalistic at-
titude. According to Proposition 3, there is an inverted-U relationship between the two
variables: there can exist ability levels that are so low that nationalism increases with
ability but as soon as some intermediate ability level is reached, nationalism is predicted
to decrease with ability. In what follows, I confront that prediction with evidence from
survey data. Three datasets are considered: the German DJI Youth Survey, the "Na-
tional Identity 2003" module of the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), and
the World Value Survey (WVS). Those three surveys share a question that allows one to
recover a respondents degree of nationalism: "How proud are you of being [COUNTRY
NATIONALITY]?". Respondents choose from "Very proud", "Somewhat proud", Not
very proud", "Not proud at all". Answers to that question are used to determine the
value of the dependent variable in econometric regressions.
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In the theoretical model, the explanatory variable "ability" refers to exogenous cog-
nitive skills that mirror inherited family traits and the quality of kindergarten and early
schooling - to the extent that they are beyond the e¤ective control of families. In em-
pirical work, cognitive ability is usually measured by scholastic achievement tests, which,
unfortunately, are not part of the datasets that contain the nationalism variable. As an
indicator of latent cognitive ability, I use educational attainment which, depending on
the dataset, is measured by three to six school degrees. As numerous studies document,
educational attainment is strongly positively correlated with scholastic achievement tests.
The following empirical exercise consists thus in estimating a reduced-form equation of
the theoretical model that predicts nationalism on the basis of educational attainment.
Although in this way ability will be measured with error and estimates will not be without
some bias, it seems unlikely that conclusions about the shape of the relationship between
nationalism and ability be driven by such measurement errors.12
4.1 German youth
The German DJI Youth Survey is a repeated cross-sectional survey which was carried
out in 1992, 1997 and 2003. About 20,000 young adults aged 16-29 were interviewed and
the survey was designed to be representative of the total German population in that age
range. As it focuses on young people, that survey is especially suitable for testing the
proposed theoretical model since reported values are not yet a¤ected by the individuals
experience of adult life. Individual ability, measured by a respondents highest school
degree, is available in three categories: "No degree or secondary general school degree";
"Intermediate school degree"; "High school degree". A small fraction of respondents are
still in school; since their educational attainment is not necessarily their denitive one,
they are omitted from the analysis.13 I also omit respondents who have not the German
nationality.
The estimated e¤ect of ability on nationalism is displayed in Table 1. The rst two
columns report results from a binary logit estimation; nationalism is coded as 1 if the
12A more disturbing problem can arise if nationalism causes educational attainment. To some extent,
school degrees are likely to be a¤ected by values instilled by parents. Partly because of di¢ culties in
precisely measuring those values, the empirical literature on school outcomes is of limited help in assessing
how severe this problem is. For the empirical exercise in this paper, I assume that the employed measures
of educational attainment mainly mirror abilities that are independent of parentsinvestment in values.
13Although the omitted respondents are younger than average, the e¤ect does not seem to create a
multicollinearity problem. In the samples used, the coe¢ cient of correlation between low education and
age never exceeds in absolute value .13 and the one between high education and age never exceeds .14. As
a robustness check, regressions were run only considering individuals who are older than twenty and only
considering individuals who are at least twenty-two. In all cases, the results were qualitatively similar to
those in Table 1.
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respondent is very proud of being German and 0 otherwise. The remaining columns
report estimations from an ordered logit model.
TABLE 1: Binary and ordered logit regressions predicting nationalism in
DJI data.
(1) (2) (1) (2)
Low education 0.359*** 0.330*** 0.200*** 0.238***
(0.057) (0.067) (0.040) (0.046)
High education -0.730*** -0.520*** -0.734*** -0.560***
(0.068) (0.093) (0.036) (0.050)
Age -0.216* -0.258* -0.119* -0.097
(0.086) (0.125) (0.055) (0.084)
Age squared 0.004* 0.005 0.002 0.002
(0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002)
Female -0.470*** -0.507*** -0.419*** -0.437***
(0.052) (0.066) (0.031) (0.041)
Wave 1997 0.120* 0.108 0.125*** 0.102*
(0.061) (0.073) (0.037) (0.047)
Wave 2003 0.010 -0.041 0.246*** 0.210***










Part-time work -0.058 -0.255***
(0.129) (0.075)
Not working -0.028 -0.169**
(0.100) (0.062)
Unemployment Benets 0.283*** -0.079
(0.081) (0.057)
Bayesian Information Criterion 10,944 7,368 37,060 23,261
Observations 14,583 9,115 14,583 9,117
The results show that educational attainment has a strongly signicant impact on the
degree of nationalism of the German youth. Individuals with low education are more
nationalistic than individuals with intermediate education while individuals with high
education are less nationalistic than individuals with intermediate education. The implied
negative causal e¤ect of cognitive ability on nationalism is consistent with the comparative
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statics of the model where optimal strategies are based on parameter constellations that
lead to conguration 4, i.e. ability levels are relatively high and families invest something
in achievement orientation (a > 0).
Is nationalism associated with negative attitudes towards immigrants? Table 2 shows
that in the DJI Youth Survey this is clearly the case. Nationalism is strongly corre-
lated with a number of proxies of xenophobia derived from various survey questions. All
reported correlation coe¢ cients are statistically signicant at the 1 % level.
TABLE 2: Correlation coe¢ cients for nationalism and various measures
of xenophobia.
Question Correlation with nationalism
If jobs become rare, foreigners should be 0.33
sent to their home countries
Foreigners should have the same rights -0.23
as Germans in all domains
I support the presence of foreigners -0.28
because they enrich own cultural life
It would be best if all foreigners leave 0.30
Germany
It is acceptable: Using violent means to 0.26
make it clear to asylum-seekers that they
should return to their home country
4.2 ISSP
The "National Identity 2003" module of the International Social Survey Programme
(ISSP) covers most OECD countries; it samples about 45,000 adult individuals. An ad-
vantage of this data source as compared to the DJI Survey is that educational attainment
is more nely coded according to the following six categories: "No education"; "Primary
education", "Some secundary education", Secundary education", "Above secundary edu-
cation", "Tertiary education". Regression results are exhibited in Table 3. Again, the rst
two columns report results from a binary logit estimation and the two other columns re-
port estimations from an ordered logit model. All regressions include unreported country
dummies; standard errors are adjusted for clustering by country of the respondent.
TABLE 3: Binary and ordered logit regressions predicting nationalism in
ISSP data.
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(1) (2) (1) (2)
No education 0.137 0.137 0.110 0.117
(0.153) (0.150) (0.143) (0.143)
Primary education 0.161*** 0.158*** 0.147*** 0.145***
(0.040) (0.040) (0.039) (0.038)
Secundary education -0.179*** -0.175*** -0.171*** -0.171***
(0.045) (0.044) (0.034) (0.034)
Above secundary education -0.271*** -0.261*** -0.249*** -0.241***
(0.052) (0.052) (0.047) (0.047)
Tertiary education -0.590*** -0.581*** -0.524*** -0.524***
(0.070) (0.071) (0.061) (0.062)
Age 0.012 0.008 0.008 0.002
(0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.007)
Age squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Female -0.002 0.012 0.026 0.044
























Bayesian Information Criterion 49,663 49,198 76,689 75,890
Observations 41,470 41,033 41,470 41,033
Note: All regressions include country dummies.
The omitted education category is "Some secundary education". For higher educa-
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tional attainments, the results show again a negative relationship between education and
nationalism. That negative relationship extends to those with only "Primary education",
who are found to be more nationalistic than those with "Some secundary education".
However, at even lower attainments ("No education") there is no statistically signicant
e¤ect of education on nationalism, i.e. the nationalism of individuals with no education
seems to be closer to that of individuals with some secundary education than to that of
individuals with only primary education.14
4.3 WVS
The third data source is the World Value Survey in its waves 1989-1993, 1994-1999,
1999-2004 and 2005. The distinctive advantage of this source is that it includes many
developing countries where educational attainment is relatively low; the sample has more
than 250,000 observations. Five levels of educational attainment are available.
TABLE 4: Binary and ordered logit regressions predicting nationalism in
WVS data.
14In this data source there is a survey question directly related to the relative value assigned to the
respondents country. Individuals were asked whether they agree with the following statement: "Gen-
erally speaking, [COUNTRY] is a better country than most other countries". Answers are signicantly
correlated with the nationalism proxy used in the regressions, with a correlation coe¢ cient of 0.33.
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(1) (2) (1) (2)
No education -0.054 -0.044 -0.061 -0.048
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07)
Primary education 0.096** 0.089** 0.099** 0.095**
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Secundary education -0.118*** -0.125*** -0.122*** -0.127***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Tertiary education -0.263*** -0.254*** -0.261*** -0.259***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
Female -0.048* -0.058** -0.018 -0.025
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Age -0.004 -0.008* -0.004 -0.009**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Age squared 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***






















Bayesian Information Criterion 288,413 273,944 437,616 418,263
Observations 249,416 236,912 249,416 236,912
Note: All regressions include country and wave dummies.
The same estimation procedure as for the ISSP data has been employed. Results in
Table 4 conrm the same type of results for the WVS data. The declining part of the
hump-shaped relationship between ability and nationalism put forward by the theoretical
model is clearly detectable in the data, while there is some evidence in support of the
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increasing part of that relationship for low ability levels.
The last wave of the WVS includes information about the nationality of the respon-
dents parents. According to the theoretical approach proposed in this paper, foreign
parents of naturalized individuals are predicted to induce less nationalism because they
are unlikely to endorse it in rst place - their  is lower, i.e. it is more costly for them
to instill nationalism. Furthermore, socialization may have taken place behind a veil of
ignorance, i.e. before deciding to migrate; this may also imply a lower degree of nation-
alism for children of foreign parents. Table 5 presents regression results when parents
immigrant status is controlled for. Consistently with expectations, immigrated parents
seem to lower their childrens degree of nationalism. Interestingly, individuals with no
education are found to be signicantly less nationalistic than individuals with some se-
cundary education. Among all datasets and specications examined in this paper, this
is the one that delivers the strongest support for the increasing part of the relationship
between ability and nationalism put forward by the theoretical model.
TABLE 5: Binary and ordered logit regressions predicting nationalism in
WVS data, wave 2005.
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(1) (2) (1) (2)
No education -0.204*** -0.181*** -0.227*** -0.204***
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05)
Primary education 0.063* 0.074* 0.067* 0.082**
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Secundary education -0.086** -0.082** -0.078** -0.075**
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Tertiary education -0.220*** -0.218*** -0.226*** -0.227***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Female -0.086*** -0.082*** -0.059** -0.054**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Age -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.006
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Age squared 0.000*** 0.000** 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
One Parent Immigrant -0.196*** -0.187** -0.183** -0.175**
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Both Parents Immigrants -0.205*** -0.094 -0.192*** -0.097*






















Bayesian Information Criterion 61,509 59,043 87,559 84,618
Observations 53,592 51,483 53,592 51,483
Note: All regressions include country dummies.
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5 Conclusion
Interpersonal relations are embedded in the judgements associated with the social cate-
gories that individuals perceive in their fellow human beings. The nature of those judg-
ments can be explained by a theory of symbolic values where agents, e.g. parents, ra-
tionally shape individual value systems under some constraints. Using that theoretical
framework, I have developed a simple model of relations between natives and immigrants
where value of own nationality and disvalue of di¤erent ethnicity are endogenously deter-
mined. In that model, the formation of value associated with the inherited ethnic trait
interacts with the transmission of value attached to an endogenous achievement trait.
Values generate economic incentives and are a¤ected by them. Individuals who are less
likely to achieve are predicted to invest more value on nationalism and to have hostile
relations with immigrants. Multiple equilibria are possible and more e¤ective schooling
may eliminate equilibria with xenophobia. Econometric ndings from three large surveys
corroborate the predictions derived from the theoretical model about the relationship
between ability and nationalism.
From a policy perspective, the model in this paper suggests a complementarity be-
tween school quality and the integration of immigrants. Between the two extremes of
assimilation and ghettoization there exists a whole spectrum of possible relations between
natives and immigrants. Integration is a two-sided process. A prerequisite of it is some
mutual respect of the identity of the other group. Without mutual esteem, spatial and
social segregation are likely to persist. The model in this paper suggests that the devel-
opment of childrens cognitive abilities through better schools has a positive impact on
mutual respect and contributes to reduce interethnic conict. The argument does not
rely upon a Victorian view of schools as intruments to improve character, but on the
self-interest of agents who socialize their children. The novel idea put forward by the
model is that investing resources to increase the cognitive ability of low-ability natives
may improve the integration of immigrants in society. Such an investment is predicted
to induce parents of children with relatively low cognitive ability to increase their non-
cognitive abilities by enhancing their achievement orientation, at the same time avoiding
to boost their self-esteem through feelings of national or racial superiority.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 1: Since parentsand childrens interests are perfectly aligned and
their information sets are identical, an agents optimal strategy simply is to maximize (5)
with respect to the three control variables e, n and a. To begin with, notice that the
optimal strategy entails n  0 for a domestic citizen (n  0 for an immigrant). Suppose
by way of contradiction that the optimal socialization of a domestic citizen entails n < 0.












which contradicts the assertion that n < 0.
The four mutually exclusive possible solutions are as follows.
Conguration 1: n > 0, 

a < 0, e
 = 0.
The FOCs are in this case:
@E[U ]
@a



















while the corner solution e = 0 requires
(wH   wL) + (bv11   bv01 + 2a) + (socv11   socv01)  0:
Solving for the FOCs yields:
a =  
[(1  2)   2]




+  + 
: (9)
Conguration 2: n > 0, 

a < 0, e
 > 0.
The associated FOCs are
@E[U ]
@a
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2[   (1  2)( + )]	
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 + 2 + 22![w + (bv11   bv01) + dsocv   22]	
+  +    422!( + ) : (11)
Conguration 3: n > 0, 

a = 0, e
 > 0.
The FOCs are (8) and (6). The corner solution a = 0 requires
















Conguration 4: n > 0, 


































(w + (bv11   bv01) + dsocv)(+  + ) + 22[(2   1)( + )  ]	




(2   1)( + )   + 2!2[w + (bv11   bv01) + dsocv]( + )	




 + 2(1  )  22![w + (bv11   bv01) + dsocv + 22]	
+  +    422!( + ) : (17)
Simple algebraic manipulations show that the eight remaining possible congurations
can never be optimal. QED
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Proof of Proposition 2: Equilibrium existence follows from standard theorems of ex-
istence of Nash equilibrium for nonatomic games, see e.g. Rath (1992). Equilibrium
multiplicity can be ruled out for  = 0, while standard social-multiplier arguments show
that for  su¢ ciently large multiple equilibria arise. QED
Proof of Proposition 3: For later use, dene
   wH   wL + (bv11   bv01) + (socv11   socv01)
and denote by
  +  + 
42!( + )
the largest possible value of 2.
Conguration 1: Parameter restrictions are necessary to guarantee a < 0 and e
 =
0. If   > 0, the condition for e = 0 is necessary and su¢ cient for the existence of
conguration 1; it can be written as
  2
2   (+  + ) 
42( + )
 1:
This conguration only exists if 1 > 0, which is assumed to be the case. By di¤erentiating
(9) one obtains @n=@ > 0.
Conguration 2: It is easy to check that the parameter restriction that implies e > 0
also guarantees n > 0. That restriction is
 > 1:
In order for conguration 2 to exist, parameters must also guarantee a < 0. This
condition can be written as
 <
   22!( + ) 
2( + )
 2(2):
As it is easily checked, 2(
2) > 1 if 
2 2 (0;) and 2() = 1, which shows that
conguration 2 occurs if 1 <  < 2(
2). By di¤erentiating (11) one obtains @n=@ > 0.
Conguration 3: Parameter restrictions are only required to ensure that a = 0.
Condition (13) is equivalent to
  2(2):
Condition (12) is equivalent to
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As it is easily checked, 3(
2) > 2(
2), which shows that conguration 3 occurs if 2(
2) 
  3(2). By di¤erentiating (14) one obtains @n=@ = 0.
Conguration 4: The parameter restriction for a > 0 also ensures e
 > 0. Condition
a > 0 is equivalent to
 > 3(
2):
The equilibrium condition n > 0 requires
 <
 + 2  22!   422!
2
 4(2):
As it is easily checked, 4(
2) > 3(
2) if 2 2 (0;) and 4() = 3(), which shows
that conguration 4 occurs if 3() <  < 4(
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